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Abstract
Multilevel governance presents a depiction of contemporary structures in EU Europe
as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies. By focusing
on emerging non-anarchical structures in the international system, hence moving
beyond the conventional hierarchy/anarchy dichotomy to distinguish domestic and
international arenas, this seems a radical transformation of the familiar Westphalian
system and to undermine state sovereignty. Paradoxically, however, the principle of
sovereignty proves to be resilient despite its alleged empirical decline. This article
argues that social constructivism can explain the paradox, by considering sovereign
statehood as a process-dependent institutional fact, and by showing that multilevel
governance can feed into this process.
Introduction
The 1990s have witnessed a revival of European studies with the develop-
ment of a new stream of theorizing: multilevel governance. Inspired by in-
sights from domestic and comparative politics, multilevel governance tries to
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overcome some obstructive cleavages which have haunted the academic field
from its emergence, notably that between intergovernmentalism and neo-func-
tionalism/supranationalism. The notion of governance attempts to straddle
the erected borders between the domestic and the international, between com-
parative politics and international relations, and between public and private
spheres. The additive multilevel points to an attempt to encompass the seem-
ingly paradoxical yet simultaneous processes of centralization (in European
institutions) and regionalization (to subnational and private institutions)
(Jørgensen, 1997a).1 In sum, multilevel governance entails a conception of
the EU as consisting of ‘overlapping competencies among multiple levels of
governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels’ (Marks
et al., 1996b, p. 167). Additionally, multilevel governance pulls the private
sphere into the political. Together this leads to a loss of the so-called ‘gate-
keeping role’ of the state, as the conventional representation via state execu-
tives is curtailed (Hooghe and Marks, 2001a).2 Hence multilevel governance
eradicates the traditional distinction between domestic and international poli-
tics.
Conventionally, national politics was the realm of hierarchical structures,
whereas, in the international arena, anarchy used to rule (so to speak). These
logics were reflected in the common conception of the all-organizing princi-
ple of sovereignty. Sovereignty is what links the international arena to the
domestic by combining independence from outside interference (external sov-
ereignty) with authority over jurisdiction (internal sovereignty). In terms of
domestic versus foreign politics, this means that the former is organized through
supremacy of the government (hierarchy), whereas the latter is based on for-
mal equality among governments (a lack of supremacy – anarchy). The mod-
ern state system can hence be conceived as having double significance: fos-
tering a distinction between domestic and international politics, on the one
hand, while providing the exclusive terms of reference to bridge the divide,
on the other (Caporaso, 1996; Bartelson, 1995). As such, Westphalia signifies
an international ‘living-apart-together’ of states, based on the doctrine of ju-
risdictional exclusivity as the defining element of their mutually recognized
sovereignty. And this institution of sovereignty simultaneously provides the
parameters for interaction between independent states.
In this context multilevel governance can be characterized as ‘the world
turned inside out and outside in’ (Anderson, 1996, p. 135), with emerging
hierarchical, authority structures outside the state for one thing, and the un-
1
 James Rosenau has introduced the neologism ‘fragmeration’ to capture these ‘diverse and contradictory
forces’ of localization and fragmentation, on the one hand, and centralization and integration on the other.
For a most recent discussion and application to the European context, see Rosenau (2004).
2
 See also Section I.
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dermining of intrastate hierarchical ordering due to circumvention of ‘gate-
keeping’ for another.3 As such multilevel governance seems to challenge both
the external anarchy and the internal hierarchy element of the Westphalian
principle. At the same time multilevel governance theorists in fact do not
dispose of states – quite the opposite, as they argue that states will not only
remain players, but even key actors in European politics (Marks et al., 1995).
This raises the question of how these emerging multilevel governance struc-
tures influence the sovereignty of the Member States of the EU. While the
focus on governance (instead of government) moves the debate on authority
away from the usual conception of sovereignty as a ‘zero-sum notion’
(Rosamond, 2000), it can be wondered whether the Member States can still
be considered sovereign if the locus of political control has shifted and is not
exclusively at the state level any more. If so, what does this say about the
principle of sovereignty? If not, how does this influence the status of state-
hood in the EU?
While at first glance multilevel governance seems an attractive, indeed
‘compelling metaphor’ to characterize the EU policy process while acknowl-
edging its peculiarities (Rosamond, 2000), it can be criticized for some lack
of theoretical backbone (see, e.g., Jordan, 2001). In this article, attention is
drawn to a specific conceptual lacuna in the mainstream multilevel govern-
ance literature. It will be argued that, in the search for a handle on the multi-
faceted and complex processes within the contemporary polity of the EU,
multilevel governance indeed provides a challenging picture of the dispersal
of authority, but suffers from a lack of scrutiny of the state concept itself. It
will be argued that the multilevel governance literature considers sovereignty
along positivist lines, conceiving the existence of sovereign statehood as a
matter of fact. This practice is in correspondence with the conventional un-
derstanding of the Westphalian constituents of supreme (internal) authority
and (external) independence based on territorial exclusivity. Such an inter-
pretation suggests that ‘sovereign statehood’ is essentially a descriptive con-
cept, whose meaning consists of a corresponding state of affairs that can be
measured and determined. Yet it is hard to reconcile the alleged core elements
of sovereignty with the ‘governance turn’, with the emergence of overlapping
authorities and shared competencies among a variety of actors at a variety of
levels. It is ‘the complex and contradictory character of contemporary pat-
terns of fragmentation and integration, including those at work in so many
contemporary states, [which] often seems quite at odds with the account of
political possibility expressed in the account of state sovereignty that has
3
 On this notion of hierarchy, see also Section I. Of course the domestic/international politics distinction
has also been challenged in the transnationalist and globalization literature.
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seemed so elegant and persuasive to the modern imagination’ (Walker, 1991,
p. 446). This paradox begs for some exploration and clarification.
This article attempts to overcome the problems of state centrism by facing
the discourse and analysing the dynamics behind sovereignty, rather than sim-
ply considering it either as a given, legal fact, or ‘obsolete’ or ‘dead’. In order
to do so, refuge is sought in constructivist approaches to international rela-
tions. Such a deliberation provides an alternative and potentially more fruit-
ful approach to account for the changing but prolonged status of the sover-
eignty of Member States within a multilevel governance context. It reads sov-
ereignty and statehood as institutional facts based on intersubjective under-
standings, rather than as existing independently as ‘brute facts’ (Searle, 1995).4
For sure, this misapprehension of sovereign statehood as a natural fact and
descriptive concept is not exclusive to multilevel governance approaches, but
counts for the majority of the European integration literature (Rosamond, 2000;
Shaw and Wiener, 2000). However, within multilevel governance it results in
a more apparent conceptual impasse because of the aforementioned direct
challenge to the Westphalian ordering principle of internal hierarchy com-
bined with external anarchy. It should be noted that this article’s focus on
states must not be read as a normative argument: neither as an idealization of
‘the state’ as the ultimate organization of political power, nor as a prediction
of the tenacity of sovereign states per se. The main aim of this article is to
tackle the coexistence of multilevel governance structures with the prolonged
exercise of sovereignty by Member States.5
In what follows, attention will first be turned to an overview of the multilevel
governance approach. There is an extensive literature on multilevel govern-
ance structures in the EU context,6 but this article will for the greater part be
based on Hooghe and Marks (2001a). This book is the most recent publica-
tion on multilevel governance and sets out to present an overview of and elabo-
rate the essential features of the approach by bringing together several strands
4
 For other (calls for) constructivist approaches to EU studies, see Christiansen et al. (2001), Checkel
(1999, 2001b), Checkel and Moravcsik (2001), Jupille et al. (2003), Jørgensen (1997b), Pollack (2001),
Risse-Kappen (1996), Shaw and Wiener (2000), Tonra (2003), and Walters (2002), as well as special
issues of the Journal of European Public Policy (1999), Vol. 6, No. 4, and Comparative Political Studies
(2003), Vol. 36, No. 1–2.
5
 At the same time it has to be acknowledged that this is not an innocent enterprise itself. By focusing on
the state, this article in a sense helps to reproduce it. After all, theory is not neutral and facts are always
theory-laden.
6
 See, e.g., Christiansen (1997); Hooghe (1996b); Hooghe and Marks (2001a, b, 2003); Jachtenfuchs
(1995, 1997, 2001); Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (1996); Kohler-Koch (1996a, b); Kohler-Koch and
Eising (1999); Marks et al. (1996a, b, c); Scharpf (1994, 2001); Wallace (1999); Zürn (1999) and special
issues of Policy and Politics (2001, Vol. 29, No. 2, and Res Publica (2001), Vol. 43, No. 1. For an
international law perspective, see Bernard (2002). Besides EU-centric literature there is a wide collection
on governance in the globalization literature.
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of writing.7 Special focus will be on their understanding of the (changing)
nature of sovereignty.8 Some parallels are drawn with the concept of neo-
medievalism in IR theory. Next, attention is turned to social constructivism to
analyse sovereign statehood as an institution on the basis of Wendt (1999).
While it has been claimed that constructivism need not and should not be
considered terra incognita to Europeanists (Checkel, 1999), it will be dis-
cussed at some length here as the focus is on the viewpoint of one particular
author.9 Wendt’s analysis of identity formation on the basis of intersubjective
understandings will prove to be clarifying for the analysis of sovereignty in a
multilevel governance context. Approaching the dynamics of multilevel gov-
ernance from a constructivist angle enriches our understanding of sovereign
statehood within EU Europe.
I. Multilevel Governance and Sovereignty: The Positivist Puzzle
As mentioned above, multilevel governance tries to move beyond the inter-
governmentalism–neofunctionalism/supranationalism debate by presenting a
new ‘in between’.10 Focus is on providing a better description of the ‘nature
of the beast’ (Risse-Kappen, 1996).11 As such attention is moved from the
process of integration (‘where do we come from, where do we go’), to the
subject itself: the European Union as a complex and dynamic institution. Con-
sequently, it has changed position from explanandum to explanans (Jach-
tenfuchs, 2001; Caporaso, 1996). Rather than explaining the EU and Euro-
pean integration, their existence is taken as a (social) fact and attention is
shifted from process to polity. As such the alleged sui generis character of the
institution is kept in place.
7
 A new edited volume, which brings together leading scholars on this subject, is Bache and Flinders
(2004).
8
 In addition, this discussion will be based on Marks et al. (1995), which focuses on the influence of
European integration on (the concept of) the state.
9
 Alexander Wendt is considered one of the key figures in constructivism in IR theory, and his book can
be considered one of the most extensive elaborations of social constructivism (Smith, 2001; Paul, 1999;
cf. Guzzini, 2000). However, it should be noted that this book is not by definition representative of other
constructivist approaches, nor has it been received without criticism (see, e.g., the forum in Review of
International Studies, 2000, Vol. 26, No.1, and an excellent review by Kratochwil, 2000).
10
 For a critical discussion of this attempt to provide an intermediate position, see Neyer (2003). Rejecting
this intermediate position, George (2004) traces multilevel governance as a revival, the ‘more modern and
sophisticated version’, and a substitution of neofunctionalism.
11
 Jordan (2001) accurately attributes this phrasing to Donald Puchala (1972, p. 267), who opens his
pioneering article on international integration with the story of the blind men and the elephant, and the
lively debate amongst the former to determine the nature of the beast they are ‘facing’. The description
of the ‘European beast’ Puchala comes up with – he calls it a concordance system – bears a striking
resemblance to the contemporary multilevel governance analyses (Jordan, 2001; Rosamond, 2000).
Unfortunately this link is left undiscussed in most multilevel governance literature. For a brief discussion
of Puchala’s model, see fn. 13.
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Drawing on a wide collection of literature on multilevel governance,
Hooghe and Marks (2001a, pp. 3–4) have distilled what they consider its three
characterizing elements. First, rather than being monopolized by national gov-
ernments, decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different lev-
els. As such, supranational institutions have become actors in their own right,
playing an independent part in policy-making (rather than functioning merely
as agents of national governments). Second, a new mode of collective deci-
sion-making has emerged, similarly resulting in loss of control for national
governments. Third, the traditional separation of domestic and international
politics has been undermined because of transnational associations. Overall,
one can speak of a tripartite shift of authority away from national govern-
ments: upwards, as a most direct result of European integration; downwards,
because of subnational empowerment; and sideways to, for instance, public–
private partnerships.12 Accordingly, states are only one among a variety of
actors influencing decision-making at a variety of levels, and do not by defi-
nition have a final say.
Thus multilevel governance comes down to the observation that, contrary
to the claims of intergovernmentalism, supranational institutions increasingly
have an independent impact on policy-making within the jurisdiction of Mem-
ber States. Subnational and local governments have gained in importance too,
resulting in ‘imperfect gate-keeping’ by national governments between what
used to be the separate arenas of domestic and European politics. The tradi-
tional lines of communication and representation via state executives have
been cut back, as multilevel governance opens up multiple points of access
for interests, thus blurring the clear-cut separation between domestic and in-
ternational politics. Indeed, these arenas are claimed to have become almost
seamless in the EU context (Hooghe and Marks, 2001a, pp. 28, 78). What
clearly distinguishes multilevel governance from supranational approaches,
however, is that it does not regard the EU as (developing into) a state. The
idea is not one of governance above the state (which would mean a reconsti-
tution of the state with all its constituents on a higher institutional level), but
rather of governance beyond the state (Jachtenfuchs, 1997). That is, ‘beyond’
in its ‘inclusive’ sense, as ‘more than/besides the state’ (rather than in its mean-
ing of ‘past’, which would connote the obsolescence of the state).
12
 The entanglement of public–private relationships is central in the analysis of EU politics as ‘network
governance’, in which ‘[p]olitical reality is held to be depicted far more accurately in terms of a network
that can trace the tight, compact patterns of interaction between public and private actors of the most varied
nature and at the same time able to make clear that we are not, in fact, dealing with a set of pre- or sub-
ordinate relationships, but instead with a bargaining process between strategies of action being pursued
by mutually dependent, but at the same time autonomous, actors’ (Kohler-Koch, 1996b, pp. 369–70; see
also Kohler-Koch and Eising,1999; and Jachtenfuchs, 1995, 2001). Recently Hooghe and Marks have also
included this move ‘sideways’ in their analysis (Hooghe and Marks, 2001b).
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Marks and Hooghe distance themselves most explicitly from intergovern-
mentalism, contrasting multilevel governance with state-centric approaches
(see, e.g., Marks et al., 1995, 1996a). It should be noted, however, that de-
spite this juxtaposition and notwithstanding the terminology of governance,
multilevel governance is still a statist approach. After all the state is not only
regarded as one of the relevant actors, but is still a key actor in European
policy-making. Risse-Kappen’s remark that multilevel governance should not
throw the baby out with the bath water, as intergovernmental decision-mak-
ing is not completely abandoned in EU politics (Risse-Kappen, 1996, pp. 62–
3), thus seems a bit premature. Multilevel governance does not by definition
rule out the option of interstate negotiation – it only means that this is not the
only and inviolable method of policy-making. Theoretically, too, the state is
still the main actor from which all the others are conceptualized, be it down-
wards, upwards or sideways. For instance the role of transnational actors is
interpreted as a movement sideways, away from the state. At the same time
this theoretical point of reference indicates that, according to the multilevel
governance literature, the state is no longer considered to be the only signifi-
cant actor and is indeed weakened by European integration. This is, amongst
other things, related to the fact that the state is not a unitary actor. In multilevel
governance a distinction is made between the state as an institution and state
executives, who pursue their own interests – which do not by definition coin-
cide with so-called national interests (however defined). Moreover, the state
as the main actor is now involved in a network or hierarchy of complex inter-
relationships at the international (read EU) level, as it is in domestic politics
(Marks et al., 1995).
Before moving on to a discussion of Hooghe and Marks’ notion of sover-
eignty, it should be noted that the terminology of hierarchy in the interna-
tional system can be misleading insofar as it suggests some sort of linear,
pyramid-like structure of sub/supra-relations, while multilevel governance by
definition does not consist of such clear-cut and top-down relationships. The
traditional hourglass model of nested arenas, with the state as gate-keeper at
the floodgate, has so far not been replaced by a pyramid structure on top of
the state (akin to a federalist structure). The authority structures seem far
more complex, flexible, cross-cutting networks of governance, far more post-
modern if you wish (see Wallace, 1999; Ruggie, 1998). Thus ‘hierarchy’ in
the multilevel governance context should be interpreted in the sense that it
challenges the anarchical character of the international system – hence in
terms of Waltz’s (1979) anarchy versus hierarchy dichotomy. Hooghe and
Marks (Hooghe and Marks, 2001b; 2003; Marks and Hooghe, 2004) indeed
distinguish between multilevel governance-visions type I and type II, with
the latter connoting a patchwork of polycentric authorities (far from hierar-
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chical) and the former coming close to federalism (hence more hierarchical,
with authority moving both upwards and downwards). They emphasize that
these types should be considered distinct, but not mutually exclusive. In fact,
both types can be located in the contemporary EU.13
Overall, multilevel governance seems to combine insights from intergov-
ernmentalism and supranationalism. But as it appears to present something in
between, rejecting the ‘either–or’ discussion with interstate bargaining and
transnational coalition-building as mutually exclusive options (Risse-Kappen,
1996) and regarding the EU as an intermediate arrangement in its own right
(Anderson, 1996), where does it stand on the issue of sovereign statehood?
In the early contributions to European studies, the sovereignty issue was rela-
tively straightforward. Even though in principle both intergovernmentalism
and supranationalism have a statist focus, their appraisal of it is rather diver-
gent. Intergovernmentalism argues that integration is merely an institution-
alization of close co-operation between Member States, who consciously give
and take bits and pieces of their sovereignty (in areas of ‘low politics’) in
order to improve the promotion of their national interests, including the pro-
tection of their sovereignty, in areas of ‘high politics’. Along these lines the
EU is considered nothing more than an international regime.14 European inte-
gration then amounts to just a set of interstate bargains that consolidate the
state system and strengthen individual states (see, e.g., Moravcsik, 1994;
Milward, 1992). Supranationalism, on the other hand, sees European integra-
tion as an ongoing process which has progressed beyond the control of the
Member States, leading to a loss of sovereignty and a ‘hollowing-out’ of the
state (Rhodes, 1994, 1996) with, as ultimate outcome, the development of a
suprastate structure – or, simply, a new state.
As multilevel governance supposedly is located in between these ap-
proaches, what kind of (sovereign?) state do Hooghe and Marks conceive as
being compatible with the transformation of interstate anarchy through the
development of hierarchical structures beyond the state? Can sovereignty be
something in between too?
13
 Now we can look briefly at the parallels between multilevel governance and Puchala’s conception of
the ‘new descriptive model of the international integration phenomenon’ (Puchala, 1972, pp. 268–9). In
order to do so, consider the central elements of the concordance system he identifies: (1) ‘states are among
the major component units of the system, and national governments remain central actors’ (1972, p. 277);
however (2) ‘[they] are not the only important factors, [and concordance systems] may include actors in
four organization arenas – the subnational, the national, the transnational and the supranational’ (1972, p.
278); (3) ‘there is no prevailing or established hierarchy or superordination–subordination relationship
among the different kinds of actors in the system’ (1972, p. 278); and (4) interaction processes vary with
different issue areas – and are highly bureaucratized (1972, p. 279).
14
 In Krasner’s (1983, p. 2) well-accepted definition, a regime is a set of ‘implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations’.
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Multilevel governance theories are directed at providing an overall picture
and analysis of power structures at different stages of policy-making, offering
a ‘sophisticated descriptive metaphor’ of the EU as a type of polycentric pol-
ity (Rosamond, 1999). The focus of attention for Hooghe and Marks is indeed
actual authority, rather than formal competencies. This also counts for their
notion of sovereignty. While recognizing sovereignty as a core element of
statehood (to which characteristics like centralization, functional differentia-
tion, mediation of internal and external affairs are added), they explicitly re-
ject a minimalist Weberian conception of sovereignty as a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force. For this would mean that Member States uphold ‘ulti-
mate sovereignty’, as they still assert a monopoly on use of force within their
respective jurisdictions. The EU does not dispose of an army or police force
to enforce compliance with EU law and policies. Coercive control over popu-
lations remains with states. Hooghe and Marks insist that, for the sovereignty
question, political and economic sanctions should be taken into consideration
too, as these constrain Member States and their room to manœuvre (Hooghe
and Marks, 2001a, pp. 5–6). Thus they implicitly reject the view that sover-
eignty is preserved, for this does not square with what they call the ‘empirical
realities of politics and political control in Europe’ that are at the centre of
their analysis (Marks et al., 1995, pp. 2–3).
In a similar manner they reject a reading of sovereignty along formal, leg-
islative lines, as they criticize state-centric approaches for focusing solely on
legal authority as the decisive resource, whereas attention should be paid to a
more diverse collection of resources, including information, expertise, legiti-
macy and the like. They also defy the intergovernmentalist argument that states
are still in control because they are the sole parties to treaties. This might be
the case, they argue, but Member States have lost exclusive control over the
process of treaty negotiation and ratification. Moreover, treaties are not the
sole determinants when it comes to institutional exercise of competencies
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001b, pp. 6–8; Marks et al., 1995, pp. 5–11).
Rather than focusing on monopoly of force or formal authority, Hooghe
and Marks pinpoint political control as a core-defining element of sovereignty.
This control is considered sovereign when it exists independently of an exter-
nal power or body (Marks et al., 1995, p. 10). Individual states cannot be said
to have sustained their former authoritative control over individuals in their
respective territories now that important areas of decision-making have been
shifted to supranational institutions, hence diluting sovereignty and weaken-
ing the state. Nevertheless, Member States remain ‘deeply entrenched in the
EU and play the major role in determining the basic institutional set-up’
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001a, p. 45) and national state actors still command
significant relative power, compared to their European, transnational and
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subnational co-actors. To date, national state sovereignty has not disappeared
to make way for a European sovereign state.
This alludes to how Hooghe and Marks do not seem to be able to reconcile
(and in fact pay little attention to) the paradoxical developments of the weak-
ening of the state in the course of European integration, on the one hand, and
the prolonged existence and continuing importance of the state as sovereign
actor, both domestically and internationally, on the other. This was not the
aim of their project either, but it still constitutes a legitimate question. Hooghe
and Marks do reject reification of the state, by advocating the acknowledge-
ment of states as social institutions, varying in the degree of differentiation
from their environment, as well as in the degree to which they may (and can)
act coherently.15 In this line, they suggest that ‘[i]f states are viewed as sets of
commonly accepted rules that specify a particular authoritative order, then
one should ask how such rules may change over time, and whether and how
they will be defended’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001a, p. 74, emphasis added).
This seems to connote a conception of Member States as regime-like entities
in the context of the EU. Yet, with the advance of institutional features way
beyond the original design, and the development of a huge and extensive body
of shared norms and commonly accepted rules and decision-making proce-
dures, the EU is more than just a regime. It is at the very least a ‘saturated
regime’, founded on the core institution of the ‘embedded acquis
communautaire’ (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 539). Besides, with a sole focus
on rule-bound behaviour, and the assumption of states as self-interest maxi-
mizing actors (hence with constant identities and interests, see Krasner, 1983),
regime theory holds little promise when it comes to clarifying ongoing trans-
formation in the relations between Member States and international institu-
tions, and emerging multilevel governance structures.
Hooghe and Marks do not try to answer this self-posed question. Their
focus remains first and foremost the locus of political power – when the chips
are down, which actor is ‘in control’? Everything revolves around (a limita-
tion of) the capacity to determine policy outcomes. They examine this reallo-
cation of authority by an empirical analysis of policy documents with regard
to the levels of decision-making across a variety of issue areas, as well as
during different phases of policy-making. Considering a right of veto as the
‘ultimate instrument of sovereignty’, they conclude that decision-making pro-
15
 Reification can be defined as ‘the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were
something other than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations
of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world
and, further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The
reified world is … experienced by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he has no control
rather than as the opus proprium of his own productive activity’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1991 [1966], p.
106, emphasis in the original).
33
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE EUROPE
cedures in the EU exemplify ‘sovereignty in retreat’ (Hooghe and Marks,
2001a, pp. 17, 28). This reminds us of Waltz’s definition of sovereignty (who,
as the leading voice of neo-realism, is a positivist par excellence). He links
sovereignty to the capacity of a state ‘to decide for itself how it will cope with
its internal and external problems’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 96). Overall it appears
that Hooghe and Marks indeed apply a conventional, positivist approach to
sovereignty, emphasizing the ‘empirical realities’ of policy-making in the EU
as central to the sovereignty issue. Yet, as will be elaborated below, a compre-
hension of sovereignty as a social and political construct, existing merely by
virtue of (state) practice to accept this institutional fact for real, might be
more helpful when untangling the puzzle relating to emerging multilevel gov-
ernance structures in the states system in EU Europe.
II. Neo-medievalism
The picture presented by multilevel governance of Member States as part of a
complex structure of authority that ‘escapes our conventional understanding
of statehood’ (Hooghe, 1996b, p. 15) bears a resemblance to what in IR theory
has been called ‘postmodern statehood’ or ‘neo-medievalism’.16 Ruggie in-
deed claims that the EU might constitute the ‘first truly postmodern interna-
tional political form’ (1998, p. 173). At one point, Hooghe and Marks men-
tion parallels with feudalism as well: ‘[b]oth the feudal and the European
political orders [are] characterized by multiple spheres of legitimate author-
ity and by a corresponding propensity for individuals to have multiple, rather
than exclusive, political identities (Hooghe and Marks, 2001a, p. 45).17
Neo-medievalism was discussed by Hedley Bull in the 1970s in his Anar-
chical Society, using it to speculate about a modern and secular equivalent of
the universal political organization as operated in medieval western Christen-
dom. In this system no ruler or state was supreme over a given territory cum
population, and authority was shared with both vassals underneath and Pope
and Emperor above. Apart from the theocratic foundation of authority, mak-
ing an absolute return to the medieval mode far-fetched, ‘it is not fanciful to
imagine that there might develop a modern and secular counterpart of it that
embodies its central characteristic: a system of overlapping authority and
multiple loyalty’ (Bull, 1995 [1977], p. 245).
If the modern Westphalian state is characterized as unitary, and the ulti-
mate centre of authority, both nationally and internationally, then postmodern
16
 See also Anderson (1996); Jachtenfuchs (1997); and Wæver (1995, 1996). For a critical analysis of the
(neo)-medieval analogy, see Friedrichs (2001).
17
 See also Table 2.1 in Hooghe and Marks (2001a), and the discussion of ‘type II’ in Hooghe and Marks
(2001b, 2003) and Marks and Hooghe (2004).
34 TANJA E. AALBERTS
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
states operate ‘within a much more complex, cross-cutting network of gov-
ernance, based upon the breakdown of the distinction between domestic and
foreign affairs, on mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, on
increasing mutual transparency, and on the emergence of a sufficiently strong
sense of community to guarantee mutual security’ (Wallace, 1999, p. 506).
One element of postmodern statehood is that sovereignty is considered to be
increasingly ‘held in common’, ‘pooled among governments, negotiated by
thousands of officials through hundreds of multilateral committees, compro-
mised through acceptance of regulations and court judgements’ (Wallace, 1999,
p. 519). The once pivotal rule of non-intervention has been replaced by more
or less legitimized mutual (non-military) interference in each other’s domes-
tic affairs. The sacrosanct Westphalian principle of sovereign rule based on
jurisdictional exclusivity has been abandoned.
Indeed, when Bull was providently discussing a qualified return to medi-
eval structures of political organization, he conceived such a system of over-
lapping authorities as signifying the end of sovereignty. He defines a neo-
medieval form of universal political order as one where states share their au-
thority to such an extent that ‘the concept of sovereignty cease[s] to be appli-
cable’, and is ‘recognised to be irrelevant’ (Bull, 1995 [1977], pp. 246, 256).
What could there possibly be left for the concept of sovereignty, if the state is
indeed in the process of losing both its authority to the inside and its ‘hard-
shell’ towards the outside (Christiansen, 1994)? Even if the descriptive fal-
lacy of qualities like ‘supreme authority’ and ‘hard-shell’ is recognized (Werner
and de Wilde, 2001), the emerging multilevel governance structures with the
concomitant dispersion of authority amongst a variety of actors, at the face of
it seem to cut right through the sacrosanct sovereign heart of Member States.
And yet again, the persistence of the doctrine of sovereignty can hardly be
overlooked either. Therefore, while Bull was right in his anticipation, he seems
less so in his conclusion. Presumably this is a consequence of his conception
of states and sovereignty as more or less empirical entities and features – that
is, ‘independent political communities each of which possesses a government
and asserts sovereignty’ (Bull, 1995 [1977], p. 8).
Such a parallel to (a recurrence of) medieval structures in any case con-
cedes that, contrary to the not uncommon idealization of the modern (West-
phalian) state and despite its inertia, the sovereign state should not be mis-
taken for a ‘natural’, consequently unchangeable, being (Anderson, 1996).
Reification misses the crucial point. As Walker stresses, sovereign statehood,
with its ‘patterns of inclusion and exclusion’ should be conceived as the his-
torical innovation it is. Irrespective of its appearance of naturalness and ensu-
ing inevitability, sovereignty must be understood in the context of complex
political practices of modern states, which are far from natural or inevitable
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themselves. In order to try to demystify and comprehend ‘the minute rituals
through which states are constantly made and remade’ (Walker, 1991, p. 452,
1993), constructivism provides some clarifying insights.
III. A Constructivist Perspective
The point of departure for constructivism is a fundamental distinction be-
tween the natural and the social world. Whereas the former consists of physi-
cal, ‘brute’ facts, the latter exists first and foremost by virtue of ‘institutional
facts’, that is, ‘facts that are only facts by human agreement’ (Searle, 1995, p.
12). As such, social constructivism distances itself from a positivist stance:
‘even our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings,
… they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo
by human consciousness … [which] were subsequently diffused and consoli-
dated until they were taken for granted’ (Adler, 1997, p. 322).
This appreciation of international relations as a ‘social reality’, constructed
by means of human conventions and intersubjective understandings, forms
the basis of Wendt’s constructivist approach to international politics (Wendt,
1999; see also Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1995; and Wendt and Friedheim,
1995). In a nutshell it comes down to a notion of the being (identity and
interests) of social entities (read states) as relational and emerging from struc-
tures, which consist of shared knowledge, material resources, and practices
(Wendt, 1995). Structures, in turn, are not exogenously given, but emerge
through process (interaction). It is through interaction and practice that shared
meanings arise, which create structures that successively affect behaviour and
constitute identities. Thus, key structures are intersubjective, social rather than
material, and as such have no existence apart from process. Still this does not
mean that subjectivity is all there is to it in world politics: ‘The key here is
recognizing that materiality is not the same thing as objectivity. Cultural phe-
nomena are just as objective, just as constraining, just as real as power and
interest. … The point is that the real world consists of a lot more than material
forces as such’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 136, emphasis in the original). There is in-
deed something connoting ‘reality’, but more than from physics it stems from
social action – the objectivity of social structures depends on shared knowl-
edge rather than mere firm facts. Hence institutional facts are objective in the
sense that they exist independently of individual preferences, evaluations or
moral attitudes (Searle, 1995, pp. 2–3, 27).
Subsequently, structure has no meaning outside of a (state) practice to
accept certain concepts and institutions as a basic rule in international poli-
tics. More than the distribution of power (see Waltz, 1979) it is the ‘distribu-
tion of knowledge’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 140) that determines how states relate to
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and act towards each other. Thus, there is a real world out there, and it con-
sists of physical, ‘brute’ facts and institutional facts alike (Wendt, 1999, p.
110; Wendt and Friedheim, 1995).
Wendt rejects the (neo)-realist reifying premise of ‘a state = a state = a
state’, which hence can be taken as given, as an independent variable or an
historical black box. On the contrary, identities and interests are to be consid-
ered as inherently relational and, consequently, changeable. This should not
be read as if they are highly flexible and fluctuating. Quite the opposite, as
structure, once developed, tends to support certain behaviours while discour-
aging others. Intersubjective constructions confront actors as ‘obdurate social
facts’ (Wendt, 1994, p. 389). This non-malleability of social structures is rein-
forced because actors have an interest in stable identities, and subsequently
intersubjective understandings and expectations are self-perpetuating (Wendt,
1992, p. 411).
Irrespective of explicitly rejecting neo-realist statism, conceived as black-
boxing, Wendt’s approach can still very much be considered statist itself (as
he happily admits) for states do indeed remain central to his theory. It is statist
insofar as he believes that, at least in the medium run, sovereign states will
remain the main actors in the international system, not least since they remain
extremely jealous of their sovereignty. This does not necessarily challenge
the relational character of identities of actors in the international system as,
so he asserts, transition to new structures of global authority will (have to) be
moderated through the sovereign state. As such, Wendt still considers state
identity and interest as dependent variables and advocates ‘historically pro-
gressive statism’ (1992, p. 425).
Essentially, interaction forms the foundation of social reality. Generally
speaking, interaction can be considered as influencing these identities in two
distinct ways. Again, there is a close connection between what actors do and
what they are. On the one hand, both interaction and identity play an impor-
tant role in preserving the status quo of sovereign states. States can be consid-
ered self-fulfilling prophecies. This is not just because of an interest in self-
preservation, but even more so because of process. Interaction does not merely
bring about identities, but sustains them too. While it may very well be that
states are committed to egoistic identities, and that structures constituting them
are rather resilient, this has little bearing on the fact that they are continuously
in process. When states are communicating (by means of state officials), they
are not only pursuing selfish goals, ‘[t]hey are also instantiating and repro-
ducing a particular conception of who they are’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 341), and so
participate in joint constitution of their identities and counter-identities. When
entities interact in their quality as states, their identity as sovereign states is
(re)confirmed. Even when identities and interests remain relatively stable,
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this very constancy is endogenous to interaction, not exogenous (as, for in-
stance, rational choice and regime theorists, and arguably also multilevel gov-
ernance theorists assume).18
Identities are always in process, always an achievement of practice and
thus the boundaries of the Self (read the state) are in principle always ‘at
stake’. This is where the second dynamic of interaction comes into the pic-
ture. Because identity and interests remain dependent variables in process,
this allows for collective identities (read the EU) to emerge from co-operation.
This holds that, as a result of interaction and shared meanings, a sort of ‘su-
per-ordinate identity’ would develop, above and beyond the state, blurring the
boundary between Self and Other and generating interests being defined on
account of ‘us as a team’. It should be noted that this not only refers to such a
‘visible’ (for symbolized) collective as the European Union. Also member-
ship of the ‘society of states’, with the accompanying norms and institutions
(one of the most fundamental ones being sovereign equality), forms a collec-
tive identity if states adhere to them not out of pure self-interest, but because
they have internalized the norms and identify with them (Wendt, 1999, pp.
229, 305, 242). This also follows from the conventional definition of ‘interna-
tional society’ in IR theory, i.e. a setting in which states are ‘conscious of
certain common interests and common values, [and therefore] form a society
in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common
institutions’ (Bull, 1995 [1977], p. 13).
Wendt’s approach can be useful in the discussion about multilevel govern-
ance and sovereignty, especially because of his focus on how state identity is
both constituted and reinforced, and can be transformed through interaction.
Sovereignty is first and foremost part of what Wendt calls a state’s social or
role identity. Role identities do not derive from intrinsic properties, but exist
only in relation to others, who vice versa possess relevant counter-identities.
Shared expectations and collective understandings are pivotal: role identities
cannot be enacted unilaterally. Sovereignty is part of a role identity as it can
be conceived as a status granted by fellow-states by means of recognition. It
is recognition (as intersubjective understanding) that makes sovereignty, be-
sides being a supposed feature of individual states, an institution shared by
many.19
This relational character of sovereign statehood also follows from the fact
that it makes little sense to speak of sovereignty as ‘exclusive authority’ over
18
 Checkel (2001a) argues that this is due to the fact that multilevel governance has similar social-theoretic
foundations as rational choice and regime theorists, that is an individualist ontology combined with an
instrumental logic of action (see also George, 2004).
19
 For a more extensive and critical discussion of Wendt’s approach to sovereignty as both an intrinsic
feature of individual states and an institution amongst states, see Aalberts (2002).
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space when there are no other actors from whom this authority needs to be
distinguished or excluded (Wendt and Friedheim, 1995). Indeed, claims of
external sovereignty ‘presuppose a specific audience – an international soci-
ety which recognizes the distinction between internal and external as valid
and acts upon the belief in the existence of that distinction’ (Werner and de
Wilde, 2001, p. 288).
Such a constructivist conception of sovereign statehood, appreciating its
quality as an institutional fact and its contingent feature (that is, process-
endogenity), could be helpful in our attempt to clarify ‘what is going on in
Europe’ in terms of sovereignty and multilevel governance.
IV. Multilevel Governance and Sovereignty: The Constructivist Key
This article should be envisaged as a preliminary theoretical elaboration of
the potentialities of a merger between multilevel governance theories and so-
cial constructivism to analyse the condition of sovereign statehood within EU
Europe. To recap, multilevel governance approaches provide a descriptive
analysis of emerging structures of policy-making in the EU. While multilevel
governance seems to capture the mood of these postmodern times, with fluid-
ity, uncertainty and multiple modalities of authority thriving (Rosamond, 2000;
Jordan, 2001), Hooghe and Marks pay relatively little attention to its bearing
on the sovereignty of the Member States. Rather, they interpret sovereignty
foremost along the traditional lines of the supreme locus of political control,
autonomy and exercise of actual authority. This focus on the ‘empirical reali-
ties’ of politics reveals a positivist approach to the sovereignty issue. Whereas
Hooghe and Marks distance themselves from supranationalism, and explic-
itly reserve a key role for Member States in the policy process, sovereignty, in
their analysis, is clearly undermined by multilevel governance when bench-
marking it against effective and exclusive control. Because of this positivist
approach (taking sovereignty as an objective, ‘hard’ fact), their analysis can-
not account adequately for the endurance of sovereign statehood within the
emerging hierarchical structures in the European arena.
Christiansen (1997) endorses a constructivist turn in order to analyse the
reconstruction of European space. Thus, his analysis is focused mainly on
change (viz. regionalization), as in most constructivist approaches to EU stud-
ies. However, just as important from the perspective of this article is the atten-
tion to continuity, while acknowledging the constructed nature of the state
(hence rejecting reification). So although Christiansen is indeed right in claim-
ing a change in the traditional image of the state, hence explaining the attrac-
tion of multilevel governance approaches as it allows us to ‘talk EU politics’
without being confined to the idealized language of statehood, this still leaves
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unanswered the question of the survival of sovereign statehood as an institu-
tion in the apparently counteracting environment of multilevel governance.
This is not to underestimate or trivialize the far-reaching and fundamental
changes in territorial politics, but the puzzle remains. And as mentioned ear-
lier, multilevel governance theorists remain remarkably silent on the specific
relation between multilevel governance and the sovereign state.
In my view constructivism can account for both change and for ‘continu-
ity in change’.20 This is not the same as continuity as such – both multilevel
governance and social constructivism convincingly show the limitation of such
a viewpoint (as advocated by intergovernmentalism). Moreover, this is not to
rule out the option of surpassing the national sovereignty discourse, nor is it a
denial of the processes of Europeanization, both of which are central to the
contemporary debate within the academic discipline. Instead, it has been ar-
gued that both apparently incompatible dynamics can indeed exist simultane-
ously. By regarding both state identities and interstate structure as endog-
enous to process, and by taking sovereignty to be an indeterminate social
construct, based on shared understandings and interaction, constructivism has
indeed a better chance of reconciling the development of multilevel govern-
ance and postmodern statehood parallel to a continuing significance of the
sovereignty principle. Such a constructivist perspective links multilevel gov-
ernance back to process, rather than conceives it as independent thereof (see
also Christiansen et al., 1999).
Particularly useful is Wendt’s discussion of the social (role) identity of
states. The ensuing disclosure of the relation between interaction, institutions
(embedded intersubjective understandings) and identity could further our dis-
cussion about sovereign statehood within multilevel governance structures.
Focus should be on the intersubjective meanings that emerge through interac-
tion and constitute both states and their sovereignty and which, despite, as
well as due to, process are rather obdurate social facts. Obdurate indeed, but
still social (in Searle’s terminology institutional) facts, and hence invariably
in process, dependent on practice, and as such always ‘at stake’.
Thus when Walker (1991, p. 458) claims that ‘[a]s a practice of states, it
[sovereignty] is easily mistaken as being their essence’, my suggestion would
be that it is not mistaken for being their essence, but rather that this ‘essence’
does not exist apart from practice and mutual understandings. On the con-
trary, the ‘essence’ of sovereign statehood is easily mistaken as being exog-
20
 This resembles Wæver’s notion of ‘change within continuity’. However, he refers to changing policies
within a stable, statist environment, which is indeed constructed but has gained stability through its ‘higher
degree of sedimentation’ (quoted in Diez, 2001, pp. 14–15). Focus is then, as Diez explains, on discursive
structure – whereby the branches, i.e. specific policies, change without so much affecting the trunk. On
the contrary, emphasis in this article lies with the role of (discursive) practice behind the basis (trunk) itself.
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enous to process and independent from practice. It is rather futile to analyse
whether Member States of the EU are still ‘really sovereign’ – for ‘the reality
of sovereignty consists in its use and acceptance’ (Werner and de Wilde, 2001,
p. 304, emphasis in the original). As long as states accept and act upon each
other as being sovereign, they are. In essence, this is what their individuality
entails.
In terms of multilevel governance, this means that it can be pictured as an
emerging structure – i.e. an institutional arrangement among public and pri-
vate actors – and process or practice, at the same time. Or, in more accurate
constructivist phrasing, multilevel governance is an emerging intersubjective
structure due to and endogenous to process and interaction. Both dynamics of
interaction as discussed by Wendt are at work in the EU context. On the one
hand, European integration can be conceived as an instance of collective iden-
tity formation among its Member States. This general idea can be traced back
to Karl Deutsch. In the 1950s he pointed out the likelihood of the formation
of new (security) communities on the basis of a ‘shared identity’ as a conse-
quence of increased social interactions within the EC context (cf. Deutsch,
1953; Deutsch et al., 1957; see also Adler and Barnett, 1998). He has there-
fore been considered as foreshadowing a constructivist notion of European
integration (Katzenstein et al., 1998).21 In Wendt’s terminology, interaction
and mutual understandings bring about certain institutional arrangements (here,
both intergovernmental and supranational institutions and multilevel govern-
ance structures) which, in turn, have a bearing on the boundaries of Self (here,
the sovereign state). It should be noted that this would be the case even if
intergovernmentalism were right in its claim that European integration is but
a far-reaching institutionalization of co-operation among sovereign states. After
all, even when identities and interests remain relatively stable, this constancy
is still endogenous to interaction. Indeed the multilevel governance literature
highlights that the boundaries of Self (read the sovereign state) are at stake,
rather than the disappearance of identity (supranationalism) or the invariable
continuation of yesterday’s identity (intergovernmentalism).
On the other hand, individuality itself is not in jeopardy. Here, the second
dynamic of interaction comes into play. In the course of their interaction,
Member States are still constituting and reconstituting their mutual identities
as sovereign states. While interaction in terms of multilevel governance influ-
ences the identities of Member States, this does not impact upon their indi-
viduality as such, because of a simultaneous sovereignty discourse. Sover-
eignty as an institution belongs to a ‘sedimented discourse’ – a discourse that,
as a result of political and social practice, has become relatively permanent
21
 See also Adler (2002, p. 99), who has developed a sort of pedigree of constructivist academics that can
be related back to Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas.
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and durable (Howarth, 1995, pp. 127–8, 132). In their interaction within
multilevel governance structures, states are reconstituting in the meantime
their mutual quality as sovereign states.22 This is one rather blunt reason why,
despite the independent influence of both EU institutions and sub- and tran-
snational actors, as well as the extensive transfer of competencies to suprana-
tional actors, sovereignty to date has not withered away to make way for a
European sovereign state, nor for the disappearance of sovereign Member
States (see Wæver, 1995; Werner and de Wilde, 2001). A constructivist read-
ing of the endurance of sovereign states within ostensibly incompatible and
undermining multilevel governance structures then justifies a preliminary
conclusion that ‘insofar as sovereignty is a matter of collective intentionality,
in the final analysis, so, too, is its future’ (Ruggie, 1998, p. 870).
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